and an apparent shift towards increased political concern with 'public opinion' and victims of crime (Drake 2012) , there has been sustained criminological focus on punitive discourses and the implementation of harsher criminal justice policies (Garland 2001; Pratt et al. 2005; Zimring and Johnson 2006) . This enactment of what Snacken (2010) calls a 'populist' form of democracy utilises a political approach that places much emphasis on the perceived will of the majority at the expense of the interests of unpopular, and less powerful, minority groups or those who have been labelled as 'other'.
Within this context, debates associated with human and civil rights often seem to descend into a zero-sum game where victims' rights are seemingly only won at the expense of the rights of accused persons or prisoners (Williams 2005; Hall 2009 ). This binary positioning of perpetrators or prisoners versus victims is a powerful ideological move. It casts victims, and those accused or convicted of criminal conduct, as distinct, polarised opposites (Zedner 2004; Dignan 2005; Bednarova 2011) . Further, by politicising the issue of victims' versus 'offenders'' rights a clear delineation is drawn between those who are 'deserving' of legal protections and those who are not. Such delineations encourage narratives which construct the 'criminal' or the 'prisoner' as having actively forfeited their rights and are in keeping with discourses that define lawbreakers as 'other' (Drake 2012) . Whilst such crude binary constructions have often appeared in media discourses in the wake of particularly violent or high-profile crimes, there has been an apparent increasing reliance on a zero-sum approach to victims' and offenders' rights in political rhetoric in Britain since the early 1990s (Sanders 2002 ).
The way discourse is used to construct ideas about social deviance, crime and 'offenders' has been an area of sustained criminological attention (Walker and Boyeskie 2001 ). Cohen's (2002) work on constructions of young people as 'folk devils' and the emergence of 'moral panics' has framed much critical analysis aimed at examining constructions of deviance and dangerousness. Recent research in this area focuses more intently on the role of tabloid newspapers (and even fictional accounts of imprisonment) in the shaping of public attitudes towards the 'criminal' and the supposed 'soft' conditions of imprisonment in the UK (Mason 2007; Cheliotis 2010) . Media coverage on political thinking concerning crime and justice conveys increased political concern with 'public acceptability' regarding prison conditions and regimes. For instance, in 2009 it was reported that HM Prison Service had:
… warned governors to ensure all activities are 'acceptable, purposeful and meet the public acceptability test' … governors have been told they must consider how activities 'might be perceived by the public and victims' and avoid 'indefensible criticism' that undermine public confidence in the Prison Service. (Independent on Sunday, 25 January 2009) This media account followed a direct order from the then Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, who, it was claimed, was embarrassed by tabloid reports of a stand-up comedy class being run in a high-security prison. More recently, David Cameron, in a speech announcing details of his government's 'rehabilitation revolution' has asserted the need for a criminal justice policy which is 'tough but intelligent' (tellingly he used the words 'tough', 'toughen' or 'tougher' 24 times in the speech and 'rehabilitate' only seven) (UK Government 2012). Meanwhile, Cameron's Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, has announced a range of reforms to prison conditions which will include banning 18 certificate DVDs, making new prisoners wear a uniform for the first two weeks of their sentence and making access to prison gymnasia contingent on engagement with work and rehabilitation programmes (BBC News, 30 April 2013) .
This article contributes to these debates by undertaking a selective, but critical, analysis of British political discourse on issues associated with the rights of lawbreakers and victims of crime. It focuses on the ways in which lawbreakers come to be seen as 'other', arguing that violent and high-profile crimes and criminals are often the basis on which such constructions are formed (Drake 2011 (Drake , 2012 . It is shown that political and media discourses also frequently refer to 'offenders': a homogenous label which implicitly constructs as 'other' anyone who is known to have contravened the law and served a prison or other courtprescribed sentence. We argue that the label 'offender' and the associated processes of 'othering' set up a false dichotomy between citizens, based upon the idea that experiences of victimisation and offending are mutually-exclusive phenomena. Furthermore, by examining the rhetoric of parliamentary speech-making, media output and other forms of public discourse, we demonstrate the ways in which victims' rights and 'offenders'' rights are dichotomised. This, we suggest, effectively creates two distinct categories -'law-abiding citizens' who are deserving of rights and State protections and 'law-breaking denizens' who, by virtue of their 'outsider' status and criminal records, are marginalised and cast into the emerging global precariat (see Standing 2011) . We conclude that these tactics have longerterm implications for the social reintegration of those who have contravened the law and prevent the emergence of more meaningful and productive strategies for supporting victims.
'Victims', 'Offenders' and Divisive Discourse
The construction of all lawbreakers as 'offenders' can be seen as problematic when considered alongside the following information regarding the launch of the Police National Database in 2011 by the National Policing Improvement Agency:
The Police National Database (PND) will be used by a total of 53 police bodies in England, Wales, Scotland and the British Transport Police. Up to 15 million people's details are estimated to appear on the database … Around 9.2 million people on the database will have criminal records, with others there for more minor offences or because they have been brought to police attention. (Computer Weekly, 22 June 2011) Within this context, rhetorical appeals to the collective sentiments of a 'law-abiding majority' become difficult to justify, since the data refer only to those 9.2 million actually convicted of criminal offences. The 'dark figure of crime' and the problem of unreported criminal activity has been an issue that has long bedevilled those who attempt to quantify crime patterns (Coleman and Moynihan 1996) . Thus, it might be argued that many millions more have committed criminal offences which have remained undetected and unprosecuted.
Furthermore, the idea that perpetrators and victims of crime are always mutually-exclusive categories is a false assumption since there is often overlap between the demographic profiles of those who are statistically more likely to be at risk of crime victimisation (Chaplin, Flatley and Smith 2011) and those who may be at risk of involvement in criminal activity (Webster, MacDonald and Simpson 2006) . Karstedt and Farrall (2006) have also discussed 'the crimes of everyday life', those offences which:
are committed by those who think of themselves as respectable citizens, and who would definitely reject the labels of 'criminals' and 'crime' for themselves and their actions. Politicians refer to them as the 'law-abiding majority in this country', ignoring the fact that the majority does not abide by the law, or at least is highly selective in when to comply and when not to. (p.1011, italics in original) Dividing 'victims' and 'offenders' into distinct groups in the public imaginary might be considered as an outcome of cultural representations of crime and justice. The murder of two-year-old James Bulger in 1993 by two ten-year-old boys is often cited as a watershed case in media coverage (see Green 2008) , which provided a significant opportunity for the ruling Conservative government to assert a populist position as the party for law and order.
Only a few days after James Bulger's body was discovered, Prime Minister John Major asserted his tough stance on crime in a newspaper interview and drove a clear wedge between victims and 'offenders' by saying: 'I would like the public to have a crusade against crime and change from being forgiving of crime to being considerate to the victim. Society needs to condemn a little more and understand a little less' (Mail On Sunday, 21 February 1993) . Haydon and Scraton (2000) examine the shift in political and public discourse on crime following the Bulger murder as part of a wider consideration of the rights' implications of this case for the youth justice system. They conclude that the case had at least three significant consequences for the future of criminal justice policy in the UK:
First, it initiated a reconsideration of the social construction of ten-year-olds as 'demons' rather than 'innocents'. Second, it coalesced with, and helped to mobilize, a moral panic about youth crime in general. Third, it legitimated a series of tough law-and-order responses which came to characterize much of the 1990s. (p.447)
The period following the Bulger case is often linked with the emergence of an almost hegemonic centre-right political consensus on issues of criminal justice (Downes 1998; Downes and Morgan 2002) . Whilst Tory Home Secretary Michael Howard was advocating the use of incarceration on the basis that 'prison works', the Labour Party, desperate to shed its perceived image as being 'soft on crime', was reborn under Tony Blair as New Labour -a party which promised not only to be 'tough on crime' but also 'tough on the causes of crime' (Sim 2009 ). Consequently, the political landscape in Britain shifted toward a more populist form of democracy that has laid the foundations on which clearer and deeper divisions have been drawn between victims and lawbreakers. Under the New Labour government, which was eminently concerned with projecting its new 'tough on crime' image in both the media and the court of public opinion, discourses emerged which drew dividing lines between the victims of crime (deserving of sympathy and compassion) and 'offenders' (in need of 'tough' responses). As Garland (2001) has commented:
The penal-welfare approach proceeded as if the interests of society and the interests of the offender could be made to coincide. Rehabilitating offenders, reforming prisons, dealing with the root causes of crime -these were in the interests of everyone. Money spent on treating the offender and improving social conditions would be repaid by falling rates of crime and a better-integrated citizenry. The treatment of offenders was a positive sum game. Today the interests of convicted offenders, insofar as they are considered at all, are viewed as fundamentally opposed to those of the public … In consequence, and without much discussion, the interests of the offender and even his or her legal rights, are routinely disregarded. (p.180)
In July 2006, the government published a discussion document entitled Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System in Favour of the Law-abiding Majority. This report included a foreword by Tony Blair which expressed concern that: 'The public believe that the system shows more concern for protecting the rights of those who break or ignore the law than those who keep it' (Home Office 2006, p.2). However, the report provided little evidence of the validity of this premise or how it had been established. As Loader (2006) I simply think you need to offer more serious evidence than any I have seen that this [imbalance] is in fact the case, rather than simply assert that it is so, or that 'the public' believes it to be so … The idea of balance almost always functions in these discussions as a piece of rhetorical trickery … It offers no criteria whatsoever for determining what the right 'balance' looks like, sets up the whole debate as an entirely zero-sum game between 'criminals' and 'victims', and offers no resources for protecting the criminal justice system from utilitarian calculation. (Loader 2006) More recently, the role of 'Victims' Commissioner' has been established 'to listen to the views of victims and witnesses, understand the criminal justice system from their point of view and try to help improve the services and support available' (Ministry of Justice 2012).
This long-overdue arrangement provides some response to continued criticism that the criminal justice system has historically failed victims (Dignan 2005) . Indeed, greater victim involvement in the administration of criminal justice has been seen by many victims' rights' groups as a positive (if still tokenistic) development (Walklate 2007 ). Yet, whilst there may be some satisfaction on the part of victims' rights' campaigners and segments of the general population when attempts to alter foregoing criminal justice processes are successful, such measures do not tend to result in a more meaningful recognition of the loss experienced by victims of serious crime. The role of victims within criminal justice policy formation is often more symbolic and rhetorical than meaningful (Bottoms 1983; Karmen 1992; Walklate 2007) . Sim (2009, p.158) argues that surveys reveal that victims can be sceptical of the capacity of the prison and punitive measures to solve problems of crime. Yet these voices have generally been ignored, with political rhetoric and crime policy in Britain gravitating toward those voices calling for a more retributive response.
In marked contrast to the growing sensitivity accorded to crime victims, lawbreakers are increasingly the targets of vilification in political discourse. The government response to the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (Ministry of Justice 2010, 2011) -purportedly the blueprint for a 'rehabilitation revolution' -pledged commitments to the rights and needs of victims within the context of an expressly punitive language about the purposes of the criminal justice system. A quotation attributed to Chris Grayling's predecessor, Kenneth Clarke, at the beginning of the response states: 'A firm, fair justice system which keeps the law-abiding safe and gives law-breakers their just deserts is the most fundamental thing a state should offer its citizens' (Ministry of Justice 2011, p.1). This rhetoric presents an image of a 'powerful state' that is cast as the protector of the rights of 'good citizens', guaranteeing serious consequences for those who contravene the law. Against this backdrop, the withholding or curtailment of 'offenders'' rights may be seen as holding symbolic purchase in reinforcing political legitimacy through promises of public safety. Drawing discursive connections between safety, 'good' citizenry, and the powerful State suggests a rationale for disregarding the citizenship and rights of lawbreakers who are, presumably, not offered those most 'fundamental protections' extended to the 'law-abiding public'.
These discourses and ways of thinking about the problems of crime produce and reproduce constructions of both victims and 'offenders' that are simplistic and onedimensional. Such constructions are instrumental in reinforcing existing fears and dominant beliefs about the problem of crime and about how those who break certain laws 'ought' to be treated. Furthermore, they draw clear delineations between the 'law-abiding' and the 'dangerous' and between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving'. Within this policy context, 'offenders' are often crudely cast as undeserving of citizenship rights and State protections. Easton (2009 Easton ( , 2011 has persuasively argued the importance of the prisoner's right to vote and how the act of voting is a means of reaffirming the social contract. She argues:
For the offender, voting is, in some respects, even more important than for the ordinary citizen, because it is a reminder of one's duties under the social contract. It also reinforces a core value of democracy, namely equality. But denial of voting rights undermines civic respect and respect for the rule of law and thereby erodes the process of prisoner rehabilitation, which should include an understanding of the obligations and burdens of citizenship. (Easton 2009, p.232) Instead, the current policy of denying prisoners the right to vote casts them apart from other citizens. Standing (2011) deploys the term 'denizens' to describe those members of society who do not possess the full range of entitlements that citizens do (that is, civil, social, political, economic and cultural rights):
The idea of the denizen, which can be traced back to Roman times, has usually been applied to foreigners given residency rights and rights to ply their trade, but not full citizenship rights … In the wider world, most denizens are migrants … However, one other category stands out -the large layer of people who have been criminalised, the convicted. The globalisation era has seen a growth in the number of actions deemed to be criminal. More people are arrested and more are incarcerated than ever before, resulting in more people being criminalised than ever before. (Standing 2011, p.14) Issues of rights and citizenship (or denizenship) are, therefore, inextricably linked with issues of criminal justice. It is to the debates surrounding political rights for prisoners that we now turn.
Votes for Prisoners: A 'Slap in the Face' for Victims?
The issue of citizenship rights and, in particular, the extension of the vote to prisoners in Prisoners have committed a crime. Their punishment is to lose their liberty. That is fair and just. What is then gained by seeking to inflict civil death on them? In what way does that benefit the victim? ... The way we treat victims says a lot about the society that we strive to be, but the way we treat prisoners also says a lot about the society that we strive to be ... Interestingly, Victim Support, whose representatives I met a couple of weeks ago, is also of the view that prisoners should have the right to vote. I hope that Members will take that on board. (Tom Brake, Liberal Democrat: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, cols 543-5, 10 February 2011) However, such reasoning was largely marginalised by the dominance of 'victims before offenders' themes. The issues at stake when disenfranchising prisoners were neither debated nor thoroughly considered 1 and, rather than discussing seriously the question of compensation to which prisoners may be entitled should the denial of their right to vote persist, debate, instead, reverted back to questions about victim compensation:
We have to make it clear that we are not prepared to allow compensation. However, if these people do manage … to claim compensation, would it be beyond the wit of the House to help their victims and families to claim part of that new-found wealth as part of the compensation for the distress that they have suffered? (Steve McCabe, Labour: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, cols 542-3, 10 February 2011)
We should take the very simple step of amending the Limitation Act 1980, so that anybody who receives damages arising from litigation on this subject can have the damages taken away by the victims of their crime. (Simon Reevell, Conservative: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, col. 555, 10 February 2011) In the above debate, there is a notable absence of consideration of the ways in which the foundations of the democratic system are being undermined by denying the vote to citizens who have become imprisoned. 'Civil death' is not a necessary condition of the practice of imprisonment. Further, acquiescing to the demands of the majority in the interests of democratic governance has been persuasively argued against by Snacken (2010) . She states:
'[Populist punitiveness] is contrary to the concept of a "democratic constitutional state", which aims at the general interest and protects the fundamental rights of minorities, including unpopular minorities such as offenders or prisoners, from the "tyranny of the majority" ' (de Toqueville 1835 /1956 , cited in Snacken 2010 . Within debates on prisoners' voting and human rights it is helpful to project ourselves into the position of subject rather than aligning ourselves with the majority on these issues. As Zedner (2005) has pointed out: '… if rights make sense at all then the invasion of a strong right must be a very serious matter. It means treating a man as less than a man or as less worthy of concern than other men' (p.519).
Moreover, Uggen and Matza (2004) and Easton (2009) Theresa May, and the short debate which followed was, once again, pre-empted by comments made during Prime Minister's questions:
Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con.): After votes for prisoners, we now have the potential for human rights legislation to give sex offenders the opportunity to come off the sex offenders register. Is the Prime Minister aware that my constituents are sick to the back teeth of the human rights of criminals and prisoners being put before the rights of law-abiding citizens in this country? Is it not time that we scrapped the Human Rights Act and, if necessary, withdrew from the European convention on human rights?
The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend speaks for many people in saying how completely offensive it is, once again, to have a ruling by a court that flies in the face of common sense. Requiring serious sexual offenders to sign the register for life, as they now do, has broad support across this House and across the country. I am appalled by the Supreme Court ruling. We will take the minimum possible approach to this ruling. (Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, col. 955, 16 February 2011, italics added) In his critique of popular sociology, Gramsci (1971) posits that common sense is 'the philosophy of non-philosophers', ideas which are distinguished by their 'fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential' character (p.419). Worrall (1990, pp.18-19) describes the goal of common sense as 'the reproduction of consensus', noting that: 'It is truth which is not accessible to rational thought or argument. On the contrary, it is intuitive, instinctive, and accessible only to the senses'. In this context, Cameron's statement can be viewed as not only relying upon long-standing notions of the 'dangerous other' (see Garland 2001) In both of the above exchanges, the continued confusion over the way human rights are understood and discussed in these debates is evident. As already stated, human rights' legislation is not intended to protect citizens from each other. It is intended to protect members of society from excessive State intervention. If 'constituents' are raising concerns over the extent to which State bodies, such as the police or social services, effectively carry out their work to protect social members from each other, then that is quite another matter.
Crucially, however, it is not a problem with human rights' legislation.
Second, the discourses utilised in these debates reinforce the enduring stigmatising effects of imprisonment through the creation of a false 'victim or offender' dichotomy.
Evidence for a false dichotomy between victims' and offenders' rights can be found in research which highlights the interchangeable nature of victimisation and offending, particularly amongst women and younger offenders. Corston (2007) , in a review of vulnerable women in prison, found that over half reported having suffered domestic violence and one in three had experienced sexual abuse. Douglas, Plugge and Fitzpatrick (2009) , in a study of the impact of imprisonment on women's health, found evidence suggesting that some women prisoners actually saw incarceration as an opportunity for respite from such victimisation (see also Rowe 2011) . In relation to younger people, longitudinal studies have found evidence for causal links (in both directions) between offending and victimisation in a cohort of 4,300 young people (Smith 2004; Smith and Ecob 2007) . Offending behaviour or experiences of victimisation are not fixed positions, yet current debates seem to crudely shape them as such. Whilst political discourse encourages members of the public to show compassion towards victims and to see them as a vulnerable, but deserving group, it simultaneously castigates the actions of 'offenders' whilst carelessly ignoring the fact that many individuals might fall into both categories.
Third, the rhetorical division between victims and lawbreakers may undermine opportunities for the successful reintegration of ex-prisoners back into society (see also the extensive work on the question of disenfranchisement in the US by Uggen and Manza (2002 ). The recent implementation of the Prisoner's Earnings Act 1996 provides a useful example. A striking exception to calls for an end to 'compensation culture' can be found within Prison Service Instruction 48/2011 which allows for the deduction of a levy of 40% of prisoners' net earnings over £20 to be paid to the charity, Victim Support. Critics of the 'victims' levy' have claimed that it may well, in fact, be counterproductive and will hamper the resettlement of those who, in many cases, have not committed offences for many years (Harmsworth 2011 ). Yet, support for the creation of such a policy can be clearly linked to statements such as those outlined in parliamentary debate.
Finally, we suggest that the focus on punishing 'offenders' deflects attention from much-needed discussions of how the criminal justice system treats victims. By arguing that victims' rights can be won by removing rights from prisoners, there is little consideration given to how victims might be better supported. And, as argued earlier in this article, there is no evidence or persuasive argument to support the view that the criminal justice system is in need of rebalancing in this way (Loader 2006) . Moreover, the removal of a 'right' from lawbreakers has been seen to foreshadow its removal or curtailment from all members of society -including victims. In 2011, the government announced its desire to ban 'convicted criminals' from 'claiming compensation for injuries sustained in attacks, in prison or after release'. This policy related to payments from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority -a body established by the Home Office in 1995, which pays compensation to those physically or mentally injured as the result of violent crime. Philip Davies, a back-bench Conservative MP, was unequivocal in his support for the proposal and was quoted as saying that: 'It is an outrage and a scandal that so much taxpayers' money is being wasted on compensating criminals, who most people would think lost the right to make these claims' (Independent, 27 December 2011). Similarly, a 'senior source' in the Ministry of Justice claimed that: 'It is ridiculous that we are continuing to spend so much money on the injuries sustained by convicted criminals when so many victims of crime are still waiting for funds' (Independent, 27 December 2011 ). Yet what was interesting about this development is that within a year, the removal of compensation for criminal injuries from prisoners was being extended to all members of the public through a drastic scaling back of compensation to all but the 'most seriously injured' victims (Independent, 27 November 2012).
Conclusion
Human rights, prisoners voting rights, the rights of persons accused and convicted of criminal conduct, and the rights of victims of crime, are all central issues in contemporary political and criminal justice debates. In much of the media coverage on prisoners' voting rights and in political debate on this issue there is an apparent assumption that granting these rights will lead to widespread hostility amongst the general public and continued opposition within parliament. Moreover, the apparent hostility within some public and political spheres toward human rights' provision for accused persons, prisoners and ex-prisoners, adds a significant and obfuscating barrier when attempting to debate the questions about current approaches to Desistance research has considered the potential of civil reintegration ceremonies and processes of 'judicial rehabilitation' where courts can 'wipe the record clean' for individuals as a means of destigmatisation (Maruna 2011; Padfield 2011 ; see also Earle and Wakefield (2012) on the need to 'deinstitutionalise' the stigma of criminal records). However, given the prevalence of the 'anti-offender' political rhetoric outlined in this article (which seems to be continuing unabated), it is unlikely that such progressive ideas will achieve recognition any time soon. That is, perhaps, until they are more effectively constructed in a way that demonstrates their benefit to the potential future victims of recidivist crime, thus making them a more palatable option for politicians and the public alike. Bill of Rights' was required to replace the Human Rights Act: 'I think he is very confused.
I've read his speech and it's filled with contradictions. There are one or two good things in it but one glimpses them, as it were, through a mist of misunderstanding' (Guardian, 1 July 2006).
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